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The undecidability of decision 
 
By Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This article addresses the phenomenon of decision. I want to examine the possibilities of defining 
the question of decision within a communication-theoretical systems theory. In this context 
communication theory is defined in opposition to theory of action. The aim is to view decisions as 
communication rather than action and therefore also to free theory of action from any behavioural 
theory including the reduction of decisions to an underlying agent-born intentionality of either 
rational or symbolic character. The communication-theoretical recasting of the question of decision 
will take as its starting point the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann and his theory about social 
systems of communication. Moreover, I will draw on writers like Jacques Derrida, George Spencer-
Brown, and Heinz von Foerster. 
 
More than fifty years have past since H.A. Simon opened up new territory to the discussion of 
organisational theory by an incessant questioning of the notion of the rational decision maker. Very 
little has changed since then but, undoubtedly, the opening of that question has created an immense 
dynamism in organisational theory. 
 
The discussion of the 1950s was highly theoretically experimental and extended to many non-
economical disciplines. For example, behaviourism and cybernetics were included and their 
theoretical potential examined. It seems that particularly cybernetics, including Shannon’s 
communication theory, have obtained an important position, especially in the way that the majority 
of the post-war discussion and re-modelling of decision theory can be seen as gradual rejections of 
the conditions of communication theory. 
 
Somewhat simplified, Shannons Communication theory of 1940 (reprinted in Shannon & Weaver 
1963: 34) can be illustrated in this way: 
 
 
 
Sender       Receiver 
                                   Channel      
 
 
                                                 
1 This article was presented at an internal seminar at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy as well as 
on a conference on Luhmann and organisation in Oslo 2001 organised by Tore Bakken, Handelshøyskolen BI. I would 
like to thank the participants for good comments and criticism. In particular, I wish to thank Anders La Cour, Morten 
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In decision theory the sender is a decision maker who sends a decision that come to hold 
implications through the reception of it (implementation). Subsequently, the organisation becomes a 
system of communication that picks up and distributes information. One example of such a 
cybernetic figure of the first order in organisational theory can be found in “A Behavioural Theory 
of the Firm” from 1963 by Richard Cyert and James March in which an organisation is seen as “an 
information-processing and decision-rendering system”. The distinguishing questions in Cyert and 
March thus become: “How organisations secure information, how that information is communicated 
through the organisation, how authoritative decisions are reached, and finally, how such decisions 
are implemented in the organisations” (Cyert & March 1963:20) 
 
In an article from 1997 James March sums up the development within descriptive decision theory in 
four notions of decision-making: 1) the notion that decisions result from consistency-governed 
action, 2) the notion that decisions are governed by a logic of identity exercised through a system of 
organisational structures, regulations, roles, and habits 3) the notion of decisions as products of 
clashes of different moments in the lives of different agents, and 4) the notion of decision-making 
as context in which the individual can develop and price his interpretation of and his place in 
existence (March 1997). 
 
Without in any way pretending to provide an adequate interpretation, the four notions can be read 
as increasingly radicalised modifications and questionings of Shannon’s model. The first two 
notions particularly question the conditions of the sender. They address the conditions of the coding 
and sending of a decision including the limitations of calculation. The third notion dissolves the 
condition of sender and receiver being connected by a distinctive channel. Up until this point the 
condition has been to view the hierarchy as the communication channel of the organisation. Now, 
the hierarchy as communication channel is questioned which means that some decisions are sent but 
never received and receptions that have never been sent. We receive a flow of communications that 
cross and connect unpredictably. The channel becomes network. The fourth notion questions the 
reception of the decision. A decision no longer automatically reaches the recipient with the meaning 
and intention with which it was sent. The recipient becomes independent in relation to the 
representation of the sent message. It is not simply a question of a misunderstanding on the part of 
the recipient but of the sent decision as grounds for a range of actions different from the intentions 
suggested by the sender of the decision. The decision allows for the recipient’s interpretation of the 
world, including the decision-maker, confirmation and denial of relations of trust, socialisation of 
new agents, enjoyment of status of influence – in general, for the creation of meaning. 
Consequently, the recipient controls the communication through interpretation of the sent message. 
 
In this development, however, which has been extremely productive and instructive for 
organisational sociology, the very concept of decision seems to have receded. It has changed from 
being the anchor point of organisational sociology to possessing an increasingly insecure position. 
Decision seems to be transformed from an intentional communicative act via a coupling event to 
becoming a particular ritual among so many other rituals. Today it is very difficult to find clear 
theoretical definitions and portrayals of the concept of decision despite the general theoretical 
innovation and refinement of organisational sociology. This might be because organisational 
sociology is still tied up to conditions dating back to Shannon’s model, despite extensive theoretical 
development, maybe because it has not successfully detached itself from a concept of decision as 
intentional action. Subsequently on may ask: If the concept of decision has become vague and 
insipid, then how does that affect the organisation as the object of organisational sociology? Can 
organisational sociology construct its object without an unambiguous concept of decision that can 
ground the very definition of organisation? 
 
Today we see reorganisations within sociology comparable in scope to those of the 1950s. The 
changes draw on entirely new patterns of thinking within biology (Maturana’s theory of 
autopoiesis), mathematics (Spencer-Brown’s calculus of form), cybernetics (Von Foerster’s second-
order cybernetics), and philosophy of language (Derrida’s deconstructivism). 
 
Different writers within organisational sociology comprise isolated insights from these 
reorganisations. Thus, as an example, Morgan has found inspiration in the concept of autopoiesis 
and Gergen and Hassard in Derrida’s deconstructivism (Morgan, G., 1997; Hosking, Dachler & 
Gergen, 1995; Reed & Hugheds 1992). 
 
In my opinion, the majority of these writers include the new insights in a way that curbs the radical 
perspectives of the original sources of inspiration, and the implications of the new ways of thinking 
are far from having been thought through in their present applications. If this was the case, we 
might once and for all succeed in departing from the conditions in the first-order cybernetics and 
discover a reformulation of the question of decision, which might reinstall the concept of decision at 
the centre of organisational sociology. As it is, the problem is that, although many organisational 
theorists today have never read Shannon, they implicitly assume that communication consist of 
intentional agents who communicate with each other through various channels, including the 
communication of decisions and the distribution of informational premises for decisions. The 
problem is that communication is often reduced to actions of information. 
 
In the present article I will introduce Niklas Luhmann’s attempt to redefine decision theory and 
with it also organisational theory on new grounds. On one hand, Luhmann’s organisational theory 
draws on well-known classics. Among his favourites are J.G. March, H.A. Simon, K. Weich, and N. 
Brunson. Niklas Luhmann himself partook in the early revolts against the rational decision-maker in 
the 1950s and early 1960s and contributed articles in anthologies with Simon and others. On the 
other hand, the rethinking of organisational theory conducted by Luhmann from around 1980 is 
radical in the sense that he not only suggests a new theory but also changes epistemology. He tries 
to move from a first-order to a second-order cybernetics. Today, Luhmann’s approach can be 
termed radical constructivist: 
 
• The world is observable but only as construction, always framed by a distinction. 
• Society is made up of social systems that consist of communication and nothing else. 
• Man is the environment of the social systems and people only appear in social systems as 
semantic tricks. 
• Actions are a mere phenomenon of ascription in the social systems. 
• Social systems are autopoietic. They create themselves and the elements of which they 
consist, including their surrounding boundaries and autopoietic operations. 
 
This approach finally breaks with Shannon’s model since communication, as we will demonstrate in 
the following, can no longer be reduced to a transfer between sender and recipient but receives a life 
of its own. 
 
The questions are: How can decisions be observed as a form of communication that cannot be 
reduced to the communicators and their intentions? How does such an observation also change our 
understanding of organisation? And how does such a perspective widen and confine our 
possibilities for empirical observation? 
 
My assertion is: An epistemology like the above mentioned opens up to a multitude of how-
questions regarding the organisation, its elements, language, etc. An epistemological approach 
enables a questioning of all those spaces of truism from which organisational practitioners as well 
as theorists usually speak. It provides resistance to the many closures offered up by the countless 
concepts and tools for organisation and management that constantly crop up. Epistemology enables 
reflection whereas concepts offer speed. The price of this reflection, in turn, is the renunciation of 
actual explanations. Epistemology does not simply open up. The condition of its openness is that 
what- and why-questions are abandoned since they invoke the opposite movement. In return, we 
obtain a new tangible and empirical sensitivity that is not entangled in the everyday language of the 
organisational practitioners. 
 
The article is divided into six sections: 1) A short introduction to Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, 
2), 3), and 4) A Luhmannian form analysis of decision. Here, the most significant rocks are laid 
down. 5) Presentation of a proposal to observe organisations as a by-product of unfolded paradoxy. 
And 6) Conclusion regarding the cognitive interest in a systems theory about organisation and 
decision. 
 
 
1. Luhmann’s theory about social systems of communication 
Luhmann’s systems theory is rather extensive. Here, I merely wish to present the main aspects of 
three concepts that are central to my article: Observation, communication, and autopoiesis. 
 
Observation 
Luhmann has stated that if he were to define an undeniable core in systems theory without which 
the whole system would disintegrate it would consist in his thoughts on and sociological application 
of Spencer-Brown’s calculus of form and theory about observation as operation. 
 
Here, the fundamental point is the understanding of observations as operations of differentiation. 
An observation is an indication within the scope of a distinction (Spencer-Brown 1969). Thus an 
observation consists in an indication. Something is indicated: glasses, balance of payments deficit, 
idiot, etc. However, such an indication always occurs within the scope of a distinction which hence 
determines the observation. A distinction has two sides, the marked inner side and the unmarked 
outer side. When something is indicated, the inner side is marked while the outer side stands 
unmarked. For example, one may indicate organisational inefficiency but the observation is unable 
to simultaneously observe the space from which inefficiency is observed. The observer sees 
inefficiency but does not see the notion of efficiency that enables him to indicate inefficiency. He 
sees what he sees and does not see that he cannot see that which he cannot see. In other words, the 
distinction defines the blind spot of observation. In effect, the observation is not “controlled” by the 
observer. Likewise, the object of observation does not decide the way it is observed. Rather, it is 
prescribed by the distinction that defines the framework of the observation how which things can 
and cannot emerge to the eyes of the observer. Formally, this can be illustrated like this: 
 
 
 
M represents the marked inner side. The outside is unmarked. Form represents the unity of the 
distinction, that is, the unity of that which is separated by the distinction. This unity forms the blind 
spot of the observation. Form does not refer to anything outside of itself, only to itself. Any form 
contains, therefore, an inherent paradox.  
 
In fact, every observation conducts a double splitting up of the world. First, the observation 
operation divides the world into the indicated and the unindicated. But it also divides the world into 
observer and observed. The observer is not defined prior to the observation. The observation as 
operation defines observer as well as object. As demonstrated in the above example about 
inefficiency, it is the observation of organisational inefficiency which causes the observer to emerge 
as organisational observer and not as lover, priest, teacher, or something else. 
 
An observation observes and does not see the space from which it observes and also does not see, 
therefore, how the observer is constituted as such. However, a second observation might observe 
the first observation and see the unmarked side of the first observation. This allows us to 
subsequently distinguish between observations of the first and second order. This is the essence of 
Luhmann’s systems theory; it aims at observing the observations of other systems in order to study 
the way that systems and their environments appear in the observations, and to examine the blind 
spots and paradoxes that their observations involve (Luhmann 1988a, 1988b,1990a,1993b). 
 
In order to obtain this, a systems theorist must prescribe himself two restrictions. For one thing, a 
systems theorist can only observe observations. Hence everything must be reduced to observations 
in order to work as object to the systems analysis. A systems theorist cannot, therefore, distinguish 
between, for example, the observation of its environment by the system and his own observations of 
the environments and point to errors or false consciousness when the organisation observes 
differently than the theorist. He must limit himself to the observation of observations and sustain 
from comparing the observations with “the world”. The other self-inflicted restriction lies in the 
realisation that any second-order observation is always already a first-order observation with a blind 
spot of its own. Observations can also only be observed within the scope of a distinction. This 
distinction is the distinction between indication and distinction since the observation operation can 
be seen as a form that constitutes the unity of this distinction.   
 
Communication 
According to Luhmann, not only human systems observe. A range of different types of systems 
have the capacity for observation, e.g. biological organisms, consciousness, and social systems. 
Naturally their mode of observation is different since their fundamental systems operations are 
different. Cells are based on life, psychic systems on consciousness, and social systems on 
communication. Social systems thus, according to Luhmann, can observe independently through 
communication. The question is how? How can we perceive of social systems as independent 
systems of communication? 
 
M
Form
The fundamental idea is that society consists in social systems. The social systems are meaning-
creating systems of communication that consist in and by communication – and nothing else. The 
sociality consists only in communication. The fundamental social event is defined, therefore, as 
communication and not as action. 
 
Communication is a flow of selection which constantly links itself retrospectively to prior 
communication. Luhmann speaks of communication as the unity of three selections: information 
(what is to be communicated?), form of communication (how is the information to be 
communicated?), and understanding (how is the information to be understood?). Understanding is 
not a psychological concept. Understanding designates the way that subsequent communication 
chooses to link up with prior communication if at all. There are three points to this. The first point is 
that it is decided by the subsequent communication if there is to be communication at all. 
Monologues are not communication. Communication does not happen until there is a reply. 
Communication is created backwards, says Luhmann. The second point is that communication is 
always open to many connections. One communication provides a horizon of possibilities for 
connection. One piece of information can be taken seriously or taken for a joke. There is always an 
abundance of possibilities in one communication. Understanding simply means the choice of 
connection among possible connections. This implies that the connecting communication decides if 
there is to be communication and how. However, every connection subsequently opens up for a 
wealth of possible connections that are selected in subsequent communication etc. Communication 
is a recursive flow of possible and actual connections. Statements bring on new statements. The 
third point is that precisely because communication consists in such a recursive flow, no partaker in 
the communication can control the communication. The communication gains a life of its own, so 
to speak, which cannot be reduced to the partakers in the communication (Luhmann 1996, Luhmann 
1995b). 
 
Autopoiesis 
The third and final concept that I wish to introduce is the concept of autopoiesis which was 
originally elaborated by Maturana (Maturana 1981:21). Luhmann describes systems of 
communication as autopoietic whereby he seeks to maintain their status as independent systems that 
cannot be reduced to other systems, e.g. reduced to an aggregation of human actions. 
 
That a system is autopoietical means that a system only consists of self-producing elements. All 
elements in the system are produced by the system itself through a network of such elements 
(Luhmann 1995a: 5, Luhmann 1990b). 
 
Communication always takes place within a social system which is autopoietically closed on itself. 
Social systems create themselves through communication. They create their own structures, their 
own communicative operations, and their own environment. When communication communicates, 
demands are made on the individual to communicate. A system of communication conditions itself, 
so to speak, as communication within the communication and demarcates itself in relation to other 
systems of communication. As part of this, a social system constructs its own perception of itself 
and of its environment. The environment becomes an internal construction in the system and in the 
construction of the environment the system is defined as that which the environment is not. 
Consequently, there are as many environments as there are systems. Through the internal 
constructions of the environment other systems are defined as environment as well. The many 
social systems are able to communicate, therefore, about each other to the extent that they have 
constructed each other as relevant environment, but they are by no means capable of 
communicating with each other. For that, the conditioning of their communication is far too 
heterogeneous. As an example of this one might take law as communication. Within judicial 
communication there has been a gradual evolution of a very specific language with specific codes 
(right/wrong) and with specific institutions (parliament/administration and the court system) and 
with a very specific tradition for the development of new concepts through jurisprudence and case 
law. Hence, when employing the judicial language in a courtroom, the bounds are rather narrow 
concerning what, how, and with whom one can speak, which means that the possibilities of 
predicting the expectations of others, and thereby the possible connections to the communication, 
are reasonably good. The system is closed and self-producing. 
 
I will end the more general conceptual exposition and move on to the concept of decision. 
 
2. The form of decision  
When I speak of decision it pertains to decision as a specific form of communication and 
observation. It concerns the observation of decision communication on the level of communication 
without reducing it to something else such as the impact of a decision-maker or the situation in the 
organisational environment and without judging the decision as being either symbolic, rational, 
hypocritical, or anything else. To decide and to refer to decisions is communication and will in this 
article only be perceived of as just that. 
 
Thus the opening question is: What emerges if we perceive of decisions as communicative 
observations rather than individual choice? The problem is: How can we observe decisions through 
theories of communication and observation? There are two options. 
 
1) The first option is to observe the way that decisions are observed, that is, the way that 
decisions are made the object of observation in a communication and are recognised as 
decisions. We then observe, for example, when a specific organisation considers something 
a decision and how that allows for subsequent communication. When we observe the way 
that other systems observe decisions we ask: Within the scope of which distinction can 
observations indicate decisions? That is, from where and by means of which distinction are 
decisions observable? 
 
 
2) The other option is to observe decisions as a particular form of observation. Decision is then 
not an object that one looks at but a specific distinction that one looks through. Decision 
then comes to designate a particular view of the world. How does the world appear when 
observed from the perspective of decision? Communicating through the form of decision 
implies a specific way of observing characteristic of decision communication and not of any 
other communication. When we inquire about decision as form of observation and 
communication we inquire about the decision as the unity of something which is separated: 
When observing through the form of “decision” how is there indication within the scope of a 
distinction? How is the blind spot of observation defined when observing through the form 
of decision? That is, how is the form of “decision” identified and which observation 
becomes possible as a result? 
 
I will begin with the last question. What I am inquiring about is the distinction by which decision 
communication happens and of which the decision is the unity. 
 
If I have reached a preliminary definition of an organisation as a social system communicating 
through decisions, then what I am trying to get at is the organisational form of communication as 
well, the form within which all organisational communication takes place. 
 
My fundamental proposal is that decision is a communication which involves consideration of 
social expectations. Within any communication there is a circulation of a wealth of different 
expectations. These can be divided in three groups: temporal expectations directed at the future, 
factual expectations directed at the organisation of the world, and, finally, social expectations 
directed at the partakers in the communication, expectations of ‘them’, ‘me’, and ‘us’. Decisions 
only direct themselves at social expectations. Gravity, for example, cannot be decided. Instead, 
decisions are directed at the expectations held by the members of an organisation in relation to each 
other. Decision communication is not the communication of these social expectation as such but 
precisely a consideration of the many different and maybe opposing social expectations in the 
organisational communication. 
 
Decisions do not determine the future. Decisions create and fulfil in the present the existing 
expectations among the members of the organisation of what is going to happen in the organisation, 
their individual tasks and, not least, what is to be expected from future decisions. Hence, decisions 
create social expectations of subsequent decisions. 
 
This kind of formation of expectations happens when a deciding operation installs a boundary in the 
communication between before and after the decision. A decision divides the world into a before 
and an after. The boundary between before and after is a boundary in the deciding observation 
operation. When the decision decides and indicates that we are now after the decision, “before” 
appears as before the decision. Not until the decision is made can the boundary between after and 
before the decision be traversed and “before” be described as before the decision. “Before” is 
always, therefore, a part of the ordering of the observation by the “after”. It has to be that way. 
“Before” is always relative to the decision’s indication of the fact that something has been decided. 
Consequently, “before” always moves in relation to the indication of new decisions in the 
communication. 
 
In the light of the decision, “before the decision” stands out as the point of open contingency with 
respect to which social expectations among the members will dominate in the future. That is, the 
decision defines “before” as the point when a variety of different solutions to a particular situation 
were conceivable, the point when much could still be changed. After the decision this contingency, 
this openness regarding the end, appears in a fixed form, that is, by the possibility of having reached 
a different decision. Only one conclusion was reached but others could have been chosen. What 
could have been changed is now established. We could have done one thing but we did something 
else. In every operation, decision communication, as it is, shapes the distinction fixed/open 
contingency concerning social expectations (Luhmann 1993a). The form of decision can then be 
formalised in this way: 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly a decision is the unity of the distinction fixed/open contingency in relation to social 
expectations and as a unity, decision is what divides the world in two as well as that which 
maintains the coupling of the two sides. This means that every decision does not merely fulfil 
expectations, it also produces insecurity in the sense that it becomes obvious that a different 
decision could have been reached. Through the deciding operation social contingency is 
simultaneously fixed and opened because the fixed and fulfilled expectations always appear on a 
horizon of other potential fulfilments. In this way new decisions are potensialised the moment a 
decision has been reached, that is, the creation of new possible connections for subsequent 
communication. 
 
3. The threefold paradoxy of decision 
This does not conclude the form analysis; we are still only at the beginning. I have identified 
decision as a dividing mechanism but we have still not touched upon the way that the decision is a 
unity of that which it divides, which blind spot it defines for communication, and hence which 
paradox it installs. 
 
Since the form of decision is self-defined and cannot be given any finalised definition by any 
external agent, it has to, like all other forms, turn to itself and only give itself to itself. Thereby any 
form establishes a paradox. However, it is uninteresting to yell: look, a paradox! What is interesting 
is both an exact definition of the paradox and also to point out how the communication avoids 
letting itself be impeded by its own paradox and instead copes with and unfolds the paradox. The 
exact definition of the paradox of decision is, as we will see, simultaneously a definition of the 
“infinity machine” of organisational communication, the infinity of communication, what keeps the 
organisational communication going, brings it to carry on and never allows for dwelling.2 
 
Decisions are fundamentally paradoxical and the paradox is threefold: 
 
                                                 
2 For other attempts to reflect paradoxes in organisations see for example Westenholz, 1993 and 1999. 
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1. Only questions which are fundamentally undecidable can be resolved (Foerster 1989 & 1992, 
Luhmann 1993c & 2000b: 132). The paradox is that no decision can reach a final definition because 
it always simultaneously potensialises different decisions. A decision (fixation) as opposed to a 
non-decision (open contingency) is paradoxical because it always contains the non-decidable. Only 
if a decision can be reached through absolute deduction, calculation, or argumentation does it lead 
to a final closure or fixation of contingency without simultaneously potensialising alternatives. But 
if one is able to reach a result through objective analysis, it is no longer a decision but merely 
calculation and deduction. So-called rational decisions are not decisions at all. The form of decision 
excludes any form of constraint including the constraint of logic and calculation. If only 
fundamentally undecidable (i.e. not entirely fixable) questions can be resolved it means that 
decision communication finds itself in a space of freedom, freedom of choice, which cannot be 
analysed away. Thus, organisations cannot analytically deduct who to employ, where to place 
investments, or how to make priorities. The first paradox is forced freedom. In other words: the 
openness of fixation. 
 
2. Decisions fulfil social expectations of the future but are always reached retrospectively. The 
basic paradox is that decision communication, like all other communication, is facing backwards. 
Not until a decision has been carried through is it possible to determine whether it was in fact 
decided, whether expectations were in fact fulfilled, whether contingency was fixed or not. This 
point is substantially more radical than that of Martha Feldman and James March who maintained 
that decisions are justified when they have been substantially reached (Feldman & March 1981: 
174). Luhmann’s argument is that the decision only obtains substance as decision through the next 
prospective decision. Only in retrospect can it be determined whether a decision really was a 
decision or merely loose talk, regardless of the “original” designation of the communication. 
Furthermore, this means that decisions constantly decide which previous communications can be 
regarded as decisions and thus might be used as premise for future decisions.  Decision 
communication always link up with prior communication and select, through this linking, what is 
regarded as decision.  Thus, it is not possible for a decision to decide whether it is decided. Future 
decisions need to ascribe to it the characteristics of decision in order for it to become a decision. 
Accordingly, practically all meetings begin by deciding what was decided on the last meeting, for 
example by approving of the minutes. Through decisions of the minutes the “previous” decisions 
become decision premises for current meetings whose decisions again need to be decided in 
retrospect in order to become decisions. Decisions produce decisions. In other words, not until a 
decision is recognised as a decision premise is it decided. Decision communication, therefore, is not 
only communication in the form of a decision but also always already communication about 
decisions (Luhmann 2000b: 222-256). Thus, the second paradox consists in a communicative 
demarcation of the accomplishment of a decision that makes a decision a decision. 
 
2. What a decision is, is in itself a decision. The third paradox of decision consists in the fact that 
only decision is able to establish the point when something becomes a decision, that is, when 
something is a fixation of social expectations. Organisations do not just make decisions. They also 
continually decide what makes a decision a decision. Who has the authority to make which 
decisions? Does a decision need confirmation at a meeting or is it enough for the leader to state how 
it is going to be? The distinction between open and fixed contingency in relation to social 
expectations continuously shaped by decision communication is thus itself relative and 
undecidable! The time of fixation of a social expectation is not a given. Decisions have to decide 
themselves – and naturally, this decision is, as all decisions, based on a paradox. Accordingly, there 
are numerous measures for the establishment of when a decision has been reached. The measures 
differ depending on the organisation, context, organisational level, etc. And the measures are 
always only partially fixed. This can be described as a form of re-entry that can be illustrated like 
this: 
 
 
 
The distinction between fixed and open contingency in relation to social expectations is transcribed 
and re-enters itself as part of itself. This happens, for example, in attempts to fix the distinction 
between fixed and open contingency. Accordingly, the paradoxy consists in the “transcribed” 
distinction being simultaneously identical with and different from “the original” and in the re-entry 
being an always already re-entry. Thus, the third paradox is that even in the light of retrospect it is 
not obvious except through a new decision whether a previous decision is decided or not. 
 
4. Deparadoxification 
How, then, are decisions ever reached? Empirically speaking, we can observe that decisions are 
actually made. The way to consider this is as follows: Any communication installs a form of 
paradoxy into the communication. If the communication comes up against its paradox, it is 
paralysed. This happens when organisations observe that they are unable to decide, and empirically 
speaking, this is often the case. It also happens in judicial communication when the system of 
justice begins doubting its own form and questions whether the distinction between right and wrong 
is itself right or wrong. In order for communication to continue, it must avoid a head-on collision 
with its own paradoxy. It has to avoid seeing its own boundlessness, the fact that any final reason is 
a mere illusion. The communication is unable to solve its paradoxes, but it can manage these 
paradoxes so they do not appear visibly as paradoxes. It can manage paradoxes so that it appears 
that there is a reason. Below, I will call this phenomenon deparadoxification. Deparadoxification is 
a form of strategy for ignoring the paradox in order for communication to continue unchallenged. 
Deparadoxification happens through the development of paradoxes, which means that the internal 
distinction of the paradox is supplemented with, replaced by, and overlaid by sets of new 
distinctions thus covering up the fundamental form. For example, the distinction politics/ 
administration within the political system constitutes a paradox since the very distinction as such is 
political. The separation of politics and administration is necessary in order to maintain a 
democratic state, but an unambiguous distinction is not possible since the administration is always 
already political. However, this fact is obscured within political communication by a range of other 
distinctions, e.g. the distinction politician/government official, decision/implementation, principal/ 
Fixed 
contingency
Decision
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contingency
Fixed 
contingency
Decision
Open 
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trivial matters, etc. These distinctions are based on the distinction politics/administration but they 
cause the paradox to fade, at least for a while (Andersen 2000). Subsequently new distinctions have 
to be defined. 
  
In relation to decision communication it is important to make decisions look decidable. Decision 
communication is able to deparadoxify itself by basically making freedom look like restraint. In a 
certain sense, organisational communication through the form of decision consists in nothing but 
continual attempts to deparadoxify decisions. The way they do it is an empirical question. In other 
words, this can be seen as a call for empirical studies of deparadoxifications in organisations. I will 
return to the implications of this later. 
 
Although deparadoxification is an empirical question which we cannot deduce through speculation 
and whose conditions are historically fluctuating, it does not prevent me from providing examples 
of “typical” deparadoxification strategies. Below I will distinguish between three types of 
deparadoxifications of decisions: temporal, social, and factual deparadoxification. The three types 
of deparadoxification relate to the three dimensions of meaning in communication. Any 
communication has to establish itself temporally, socially, and factually. Temporality pertains to the 
definition of time. The actualisation of the communication, its presence, consists in the tension 
installed by the communication when it distinguishes between a horizon of expectations and a space 
of experience (Luhmann 1995b). Both past and future are constructions within the communication 
and they are always inter-relational. In the words of Luhmann, what moves in time is 
past/present/future together, in other words, the present along with its past and future horizons 
(Luhmann 1982: 307). Sociality concerns the definition of the recipients of the communication in 
their non-identity with each other. The social space is constructed in every communication as a 
tension between “us” and “them” in which no “us” can exist except in the comparison to “them”. 
Finally, the communication has to establish itself factually in as far as it communicates about 
something. Factually, it concerns the choice of themes and objects for the communication. Themes 
and objects are structured according to the distinction this/something else, “being-one-thing-and-
not-another”. 
 
Factual deparadoxification is fundamentally a matter of seeing decisions as reactions to “the nature 
of the case”. The best well-known strategy for factual deparadoxification consists in supplying 
alternatives to choose from. Accordingly, many introductions within organisation theory often 
define decisions as a choice between alternatives (Luhmann 1993a). Through the presentation of 
alternatives, a situation of choice can exist despite the selection of certain alternatives among an 
infinite number of choices. But the formulation of alternatives is itself a decision dividing the world 
into what is important and not so important, implying decisions about the exclusion of other 
potential alternatives. It is not self-evident which alternatives represent alternatives among 
themselves. Therefore, the definition of alternatives must itself go through a process of 
deparadoxification. Typically, this happens through reference to the “environment” as compelling 
imperative. By naturalising the environment and describing its imposing tendencies, the decision 
becomes a reaction to the environment. The “market”, “globalisation”, or “new economy” address 
themselves and hence the environment is constructed as “someone” who decides that a decision 
must be reached and who becomes the natural point of reference when determining the relevance of 
an alternative. Reference to the environment as something given, something beyond choice, 
constitutes the choice as choice. Through the naturalisation of the environment alternative 
constructions of the environment, which would have allowed for the emergence of other 
alternatives, are ruled out. Thus, the organisational boundary to the environment becomes the blind 
spot arresting the regress and installing the necessity of possibility. This means that the choice of 
factual references are decisions as well, that is, decisions about which premises for decisions are 
defined in order for decisions to become decidable. 
 
Temporal deparadoxification concerns the definition of decisions as a reaction to the gravity of the 
moment. In order for a decision to be decided, it has to be necessary, not able to be postponed 
(Derrida 1992: 26). A decision is an arrest of that which precedes it; talk is interrupted by decision. 
The moment of decision is always a finally pressing and abrupt moment no matter how much time 
the decision may allow itself. Within the time dimension, deparadoxification is about the creation of 
this moment of decision which cannot be deferred even a moment. Colloquially, we are familiar 
with the problem from phrases like “the moment has come”, “the moment is ripe” or the reverse, 
“the moment is not yet ripe for this decision” (On “the right moment” see also Kirkeby 2000). The 
decision must be synchronised with “the times”. This can happen in a number of ways. A temporal 
strategy for deparadoxification concerns the sequencing of time. The undecidability of the decision 
is sought minimised by dividing the decision into tempi which can “ripen” the decision on the way. 
Considering building a tunnel between Elsinore and Helsingborg is to “big”, but we can begin by 
finding out about the technical possibilities for doing so. By splitting the decision up into smaller 
bites, decidable and feasible onto themselves because the implications seem manageable, little by 
little premises for decisions can accumulate, making the overall decision look both smaller and less 
pressing, almost as a necessary and logical consequence. Decision reports contain a multitude of 
proposals for such sequencing, for example goal-plan-implementation-evaluation. The construction 
of future scenarios represents a different strategy for deparadoxification. The distinction between 
past and future in decision communication is a distinction between what can no longer be changed 
and what can still be changed. In this light, the definition of future scenarios is a strategy for 
deparadoxification which is intended to make “what can still be changed” look like “something that 
cannot be changed” as alternative paths to the future capable of defining the choice of the present. 
Oftentimes, a particular scenario is put forth as representing a more appealing future than the other 
scenarios. Like in the Roman circus, only one door hides a beautiful woman. Behind the other doors 
is a hungry lion. All scenarios assume different decisions. In the light of the scenarios it becomes 
clear which decisions are acceptable in the long run and which decisions are not, despite short-term 
advantages. The staging of decisions by the scenarios hides the fact that a range of other scenarios 
could have been formulated with the implications of completely different obvious decisions. 
 
Finally, social deparadoxification is about making decisions look as if they had in fact already been 
made so that their formalisation is the only thing left. Social deparadoxification can happen through 
“political analyses” or “interest analyses” of the decision-making situation. By pointing out central 
players in the environment and attributing them with authority, preferences, and strategies, the 
decision eventually takes the shape of social imperative. While communication takes place 
concerning the possible stance of the managing director, what the interests of department X might 
be, which strategy management seems to follow at present, the decision premises for the decision 
are unnoticeably resolved. The isolation and description of “them” defines “us” as decision-makers. 
After such “analyses” the decision gradually becomes nothing more than the resolve to either accept 
or be at the foreground of the inevitable decision. It seems obvious that “we” must reach precisely 
this decision now while we can still be at the foreground and both be recognised and influence the 
decision. 
 
5. The organisational system as unfolded paradoxy 
I have argued 1) that decision is a particular form composed by the unity of fixed and open 
contingency in relation to social expectations, 2) that the form of decision installs a paradoxy in all 
decision communication, 3) that, as a result, decision communication can be studied as the 
empirical unfolding of this paradoxy as sundry attempts to make undecidable questions appear 
decidable. Where does this take us? How about the concept of organisation? 
 
The typical approach to organisations in organisation theory is ontological. Usually, one seeks to 
answer the question of what an organisation is. One attempts to define the organisation as 
organisation as something given, a constant, which then allows for the study of various 
organisational variables: structure, culture, strategy, inner and outer complexity, etc. including the 
comparison of different organisations. The communication-theoretical approach, on the other hand, 
makes it possible to extend the problem of the organisation beyond ontology. Rather than asking 
what, we might then ask how an organisation emerges. The only needed assumption is the fact that 
organisational systems are formed around decision communication. Or in other words: 
Organisations are nothing but the concomitant bi-product of the unfolding paradoxy of the form of 
decision. All other questions concerning the elements and characteristics of organisations are 
empirical. With the above definition, we do not need to characterise organisations through 
predefined phenomena and elements such as culture, structure, or management. Organisations and 
their elements are created through the decision communication when decisions confirm decisions 
and transform them into premises for decisions. “What” an organisation is and consists of is a 
consequence of how organisations deparadoxify decisions and turn them into premises for 
decisions. 
 
The intricate point is that organisational systems create themselves through decisions, and through 
decisions it is defined what a decision is. As the productive operation of the system, therefore, 
decision creates itself as well.  This is the autopoiesis of organisations. Organisational elements are 
always products of the unfolding of the paradoxy of decision which amounts to saying that 
organisations are created on the basis of the impossibility of decisions. 
 
A decision makes itself by deciding on premises for decisions and the organisational system 
emerges through the decision of these premises. How a premise becomes a premise is an open 
question that varies from organisation to organisation, but the historical conditions of the 
organisations’ constructions of premises is also changed through the change of the language, the 
semantics, available to decision communication. As an example, “culture”, “values”, and “spirit” 
are rather new concepts to organisational self-description that become available when a decision 
turns something into a premise for decision. 
 
Nevertheless, I want to emphasise four typical premises: An organisational system decides its limit 
as a limit for the validity of decisions through the establishment of membership, including the 
definition of membership and of who can be a member. An organisational system decides its 
purpose by deciding on some kind of program for what its decisions are going to be about even if 
the objective premise for decision is not necessarily particularly precise or obvious. The third 
element is differentiation and co-ordination of “actions” for example in the shape of tasks, 
positions, and staff which constitute the social premise for decision. And finally the form of decision 
is a premise for decision that has to be decided in order for the organisation to establish its limit, its 
program, and its staff. The autopoiesis of the organisation is illustrated below with decision as the 
autopoietical operation: 
 
The organisational system 
 
 
 
But are organisations completely closed? They are completely closed in the sense that all their 
elements are premises for decisions, which, in order to be premises for decisions, must themselves 
have been decided. However, this closure also opens up the organisation, although never to the 
point that something “foreign” might penetrate the organisation. Organisations are open in the sense 
that they can communicate about the environment and thereby observe the environment. But they 
always observe the world from the perspective of a defined horizon that determines what they can 
and cannot see, and they are never able to see what they cannot see. This can be formulated 
differently: Decision communication can obtain information about the world but information is 
nothing in itself. It is not an essence. Information is, in the words of Bateson, a difference which 
makes a difference for a subsequent event (Bateson 1972). That is, information is always systems 
relative. Information cannot simply cross the organisational boundary (Luhmann 2000a: 15-22). 
They are not external inputs but must be produced as information by the organisational system 
itself. When we are dealing with decision communication, information is always a difference which 
makes a difference in relation to a subsequent decision communication, that is, it functions as a 
specific type of premise for decision – and as mentioned above, premises are always already 
decided premises. 
 
6.The relationship between organisation theory and organisations 
The purpose of this kind of contra-intuitive exposition of decisions and organisation is to facilitate 
guiding principles for observation of the second order. In the end, systems theory is no more than a 
program for the observation of observations and their blind spots. In this sense systems theory is 
also highly reductionistic. Its only object is observation. This simple foundation, however, is what 
brings on complexity on the level of empirical analysis. Precisely because systems theory strives for 
the concrete on the level of the concrete – observations as observation not reduced to something 
else – does conceptual precision become so significant. Without a high level of precision, second-
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order observation is reduced to first-order observation. One is swallowed up by the languages of the 
different areas. One takes to every-day abstractions that appear concrete because of their familiarity: 
People act, decisions are individual choices and thus also acts, organisations are, an organisation 
has a culture, etc. In other words, one needs an incredible level of conceptual precision if one 
chooses observations and their concepts as object; otherwise one ends up merging with the 
observed. 
 
In other words: Luhmann’s theory about decision and organisation is not a theory about what 
decisions are, what an organisation is, or why organisations reach particular decisions. It is not a 
theory of explanations and probably not even a theory of understanding. The theory merely serves 
as program for the observation of how organisations emerge through observations. Thus, rather than 
a theory in the classical sense, Luhmann’s theory represents a program and an analytical strategy for 
the way second-order observers may condition their way of seeing in order for organisational 
communication to appear as observable observations. 
 
But what is the epistemological interest in this kind of approach? What does this kind of decision- 
and organisation theory offer? It can pose impractical questions to practice. 
 
From a systems theoretical perspective organisation theory may observe the observations of 
organisations and expose their blind spots. A systems-theoretical organisation theory is able to 
represent as contingent and artificial that which organisations consider necessary and natural 
(Luhmann 1993c: 226). In this sense, a systems-theoretical organisation theory works in the 
opposite direction from organisations. Whereas organisations in their strategies to deparadoxify 
decisions need to make freedom look like restraint by referring to “necessity” and to “the nature of 
things”, systems theory is able to reproduce “natural” and “necessary” as contingent decisions.  
 
At a time when new truisms are introduced on a daily basis, when there exists an enormous market 
for all sorts of management concepts, when prospects of the future have become a commodity as 
well as a management technology, the most practical research strategy might be one that asks 
questions about the naturalness of these concepts and future prospects. Moreover, it might be 
practical for the organisations that impractical questions are put to them concerning their concepts, 
their view of the external environment, social technologies, and concepts and practices in general? 
For example: 
 
¾ How did the “new economy” appear as semantics and become installed as natural? What 
does the “new economy” pave and obstruct the way for respectively? How is it assigned 
meaning in the decision communication of different organisations? How does the concept 
“new economy” open a battle about organisations’ assignment of status on the time 
dimension as a sign of the past and the future respectively where it makes perfect sense to 
call a billion dollar business transaction a dinosaur while a similar deficit in an IT-company 
can also represent foresight? 
 
 
¾ How do organisations deparadoxify decisions through internal constructions of their external 
environment? How do they introduce the environment as natural and as external imperative? 
What are the effects on an organisation if it becomes too conscious of its own boundary with 
the environment and realises the contingency of the construction of relevant environment? 
How does an organisation become a stranger within its own space when having a repertoire 
of alternative figures of argumentation and environment constructions at its disposal 
(Andersen 2000a)? 
 
¾ How do organisations seek to represent themselves within themselves? How are the 
conditions for self-description changed in an organisation when not only top management 
but the entire staff of an organisation is expected too be in charge? When defining 
management as a self-relation everywhere in the organisation, how can management then be 
identified as a delimited sub-system? How do organisations emerge at all when each 
individual “self-managing employee” is expected to form his own picture of the 
organisational unity, which produces organisations that represent themselves within 
themselves through countless different unities? (Andersen 2000b, Andersen & Born 2001). 
 
¾ How is the “complete employee” produced as semantic tricks? Which mechanisms of in- 
and exclusion employ “the complete employee” in relation to the psychic systems?  Which 
kind of conversational order is installed in the name of “dialogue” in so called 
conversational systems such as performance reviews, progress reports, and ambition 
dialogues (Andersen & Born 2001)? 
 
¾ How do conditions for decision communication change when organisations see their 
environment as increasingly complex, undefined, and turbulent and refer to flexibility and 
constant change as the stable essence of the organisation? Which conditions for 
communication occur when adaptability replaces stability in the distinction between stability 
and change? (Andersen & Born 2000). 
 
These types of question are refined when seen through a Luhmannian eye. Here, the Luhmannian 
universe offers a flexible and expansive analytical-strategic apparatus (Andersen 1999) while also 
providing the researcher with a kind of immune response to the intuitive insights of the field. 
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